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Abstract 
Th is study investigates the eff ects of pay vis-à-vis elements of the ethics infrastruc-
ture that contribute to eff ective administrative control; and to unethical practices in 
the Nigerian public service. Based on critical analysis of primary offi  cial and secondary 
data, the study reveals that corruption and fi nancial impropriety are far more common 
and intense among higher public offi  cials who, incidentally, are better remunerated, 
than among the lower cadre offi  cials, who are poorly remunerated. Th e study shows 
that despite the emphasis on the compliance or sanction approach to administrative 
ethics rather than the virtue approach, there is still wide incongruence between the 
ethical approach adopted and the expected results. Th is is because of the existence of 
a weak political and administrative control system at the higher administrative func-
tions. Th e study suggests that reducing unethical practices should aim at improving 
openness and transparency at the high level through more citizen involvement and 
civil society action, reviewing the criminal justice system to ensure severe punishment 
that can serve the purpose of deterrence and prevention, speedy dispatch of corruption 
cases and strengthening of oversight linkages between the public institutions and eth-
ics coordinating institutions.
Keywords: Administrative ethics, pay; administrative control; ethics infrastruc-
ture; Nigerian public service.
Citation: Ikeanyibe, O. & Ibietan, J. (2018). Th e Eff ect of Pay and Administrative Con-
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Introduction 
Employees’ remuneration, or pay, is a major variable for evaluating their or-
ganizational behaviour. Since the time of Frederick Taylor and the scientifi c man-
agers, the consideration of pay as a motivation for employee performance has gen-
erally attracted support in the literature. Financial rewards have the capacity to 
maintain and motivate individuals towards higher performance (Dobre, 2013). 
On the other hand, it can also fail to boost productivity and improve performance 
signifi cantly (Whitley, 2002). Th ese dual characteristics of pay as a motivator can 
also be extended to the examination of issues of unethical fi nancial practices such 
as fraud, bribe taking and other self-enriching practices of public offi  cials. Th e 
question can be asked as to whether employee pay or remuneration determines 
the level of unethical fi nancial practices in a public service system. Scholars like 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) have posited that if public sector pay is very low, corrup-
tion tends to be a survival strategy. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show that 
relative high wages of public servants are associated with lower corruption. Simi-
larly, Dmochowski, Jurczuk and Szczepankowski (n.d.) aver that public service 
conditions, may be more or less conducive to ethical behavior by public servants. 
Th us, low pay in the public sector may be blamed for the prevalence of corrup-
tion and other unethical practices especially in low-income countries. Adedokun 
(2016) avers that any country intent on seriously fi ghting corruption must pay 
public servants fair and realistic wages benchmarked to private sector earnings. 
While the above observations cannot be ignored, it appears, however that this 
cannot be a unilateral and one dimensional relationship as in the case of pay and 
motivation. Low pay does not constitute a necessary and suffi  cient condition for 
unethical fi nancial behaviour of public offi  cials. A number of other components 
have been found to equally determine the ethical behaviour of workers. Th e Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has, since 1996, 
evolved the notion of ethics infrastructure. Th e ethics infrastructure is a range of 
tools and processes to regulate undesirable behaviour and to provide incentives 
for good conduct among workers. Following surveys and analyses of approaches 
adopted by member countries on how public servants can be given support in 
observing the highest standards of integrity and ethics in the public sector envi-
ronment, the OECD Public Management Committee (PUMA) underscored eight 
vital elements that constitute a holistic and comprehensive strategy in determin-
ing factors infl uencing ethical behaviour in the public service of OECD countries. 
A cursory look at the components of the OECD ethics infrastructure reveals that 
these are also measures applied by other countries in an eff ort to deal with is-
sues of ethics and corruption. Th ey include: political commitment, eff ective legal 
framework, effi  cient accountability mechanisms and workable codes of conduct, 
professional socialization mechanisms (including training), supportive public ser-
vice conditions, existence of a central ethics coordinating body and an active civil 
society able to act as a watchdog over the actions of offi  cials. 
Th e divergence in the ethical statuses of countries apparently depends on the 
degree of effi  ciency and eff ectiveness in institutionalizing the ethics infrastructure. 
Th e OECD survey (1996) also reveals that countries embark on some permutations 
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in establishing the ethics infrastructure. Invariably, countries pay more attention to 
some of the elements in relation to their ethics climate (Stare & Klun, 2016). It is in 
this vein that this study seeks to evaluate the relative importance of the elements in 
determining the level of ethical success or failure in the Nigerian public service sys-
tem. Th e questions that the research seeks to answer include: what factors promote 
unethical practices in the Nigerian public service? How does the component of pay 
contrast with administrative control measures in relation to the low and high level 
public offi  cials in this challenge? Specifi cally, the study investigates and compares 
the level of pay among the higher and lower cadre public offi  cials as well as the eff ec-
tiveness and comprehensiveness of administrative control at the two levels. Findings 
show that poor administrative control plays a more signifi cant role in supporting 
unethical behaviour in the Nigerian public service than pay. Th e study therefore 
suggests that reducing unethical practices should aim at ensuring that the topmost 
layers of the public organisations are eff ectively checked and controlled.
Th e Nature of Administrative Ethics
Th e importance of ethical consideration in politics or as a social phenomenon 
dates back to the time of Greek philosophers who were concerned with life in the 
polis – the Greek city states. Some of the notable Greek Philosophers like Plato and 
Aristotle regarded ethics as a part of politics, the main function of which was to 
provide the conditions under which the members of the human community, the 
polity, would be able to achieve lasting happiness (Makrydemetres, 2002). Th e cen-
tral discussion about politics was the question of virtue or vice, goodness or bad-
ness, and rightness or wrongness of human actions. Primarily, ethics is a branch of 
philosophy that tries to logically establish the basis or standard for human action, 
whether as applicable to oneself or to the society. Th us, ethics can basically be dis-
tinguished into personal and social ethics; personal ethics being applicable to the 
individual person while social ethics concerns itself with groups (Lynch & Lynch, 
2006). Th e intrinsic connection between the two aspects lies in the fact that social 
actions are carried out by individuals. Th us, no matter how we perceive countries, 
societies, groups or their organisations and institutions as legal personalities, their 
actions are ultimately reducible to that of individuals or at least a collection of in-
dividuals. Th is therefore raises the question of fi duciary and moral responsibility 
on the individual, about how his actions should benefi t or disadvantage the society. 
Th is of course has not obfuscated the fact that ethics is also about the good life 
of the individual, which may or may not synchronize with the ‘social’ goal. Life 
is personal and the good life could be evaluated using diff erent and oft en contra-
dicting standards. Hence, ethics as a concept is “open to confl icting interpretations’ 
(Martinez, 2008, p. 15). While it may be objectively determined using some agreed 
universally valued standards such as “honesty, respect for others, trustworthiness” 
(Denhardt, n.d.), for some, it could as well be subjective and relative.
Th e challenge of setting a framework for ethical standard is less complicated 
for social ethics to which administrative ethics could be classifi ed, because it is 
usual to assume certain common goals of a social group than it is to defi ne what 
the good life is for individuals. In other words, for group or social ethics such as 
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administrative ethics, it is easier to defi ne standards in terms of law, codes, customs 
and traditions or even guides, rules and regulations. Social ethics embraces a set 
of norms, assessments and opinions, which are characteristic of a group of people. 
It points to society, citizens, groups of people as creators of norms and standards 
of behavior (Dmochowski, Jurczuk & Szczepankowski, n.d.). Th is is why Martinez 
(2008, p. 15) sees law as a concept developed by governments to ensure that citi-
zens engage in ‘right conduct’. For him, “the western legal system is grounded on 
public rules, known and knowable beforehand, governing the manner in which 
persons within a regime act in conducting public transactions.” 
It is not just the western legal system but legalisms in every form (natural, 
social, organizational) which have the objective of determining the basis for right 
conduct of a group. For this reason, we fi nd that the ethical standards that ap-
ply to social positions (e.g. public offi  cials, doctors, lawyers, military personnel, 
and clergy) refl ect the roles and relationships common to that position (Denhardt, 
n.d.). As a social concern therefore, ethics can be considered as a disposition to act 
right or wrongly in line with the wishes and benefi ts of a society. It is in this sense 
that one can talk of standards of professional conduct or standards of religious 
conduct, standards of medical practice, standards of the scholarship professional 
practices, standards of administrative practice, and standards of Christian or Mus-
lim behaviour (Asobie, 2001). Social ethics demands that subscribing to member-
ship of a group or accessing a position necessitates that one should subject oneself 
to the ethical codes of such group, in spite of his or her own personal ethical stan-
dards. Th is does not justify the adequacy or correctness of social ethical standards 
understood in terms of law in comparison to individual moral standards. But so-
cial, group or organizational life demands compromises of values one holds dear. 
Social ethical standard requires one to “work within the system as far as basic 
decency will allow” (Rohr, 1989, p. 11). Where the basic decency is not allowed, 
the individual reserves that moral right of resignation in protest or resignation on 
grounds of conscience (Weisband & Frank, 1975) rather than violate the law. 
Th e point here is that there are two broad conceptual traditions in adminis-
trative ethics – the moralist and the instrumentalist traditions. Th e moralist school 
tends toward institutional reform, through law and other regulatory mechanisms, 
while the instrumentalist is more likely to focus on design and enhancement of 
problem-solving capacities (O’Kelly & Dubnik, 2012). UNDP (2007) describes the 
approaches required by these traditions to maintain ethical public service as com-
pliance-based and integrity-based ethics management approaches. Anello (2006, 
p. 3) sees them as strategies towards eff ective ethics administration in the public 
service. Using unethical behaviour of corruption as example, he avers:
Eff orts to address the issue of corruption in the public sector have focused 
on the application of two basic strategies. One strategy has been a legislative 
reform approach, which establishes laws against corruption with appropriate 
punitive consequences for violations. Th is approach is oft en referred to as the 
“discipline approach”, which attempts to deter corrupt practices through the 
fear of punishment. Th e second strategy, oft en termed the “values approach”, 
attempts to increase institutional integrity by promoting moral values and 
ethical principles as a way of motivating public servants to behave ethically.
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Th e discipline approach is compliance-based and focuses on strict compliance 
with descriptive administrative procedures, control mechanisms and detailed rules 
which defi ne what public servants should avoid, what they should do, and how they 
should do it. Th e value approach, which is discussed also as the virtue ethics in lit-
erature (Frankena, 1973; Cooper, 1987), on the other hand entails promoting moral 
values and ethical principles and making the public offi  cials imbibe them as personal 
ethical values. It is integrity-based and “encourages good behaviour rather than polic-
ing and punishing errors and wrongdoing” (OECD, 2000, p. 25). According to Cooper 
(1987, p. 321), it concerns “‘predispositions’ or ‘inclinations,’ traditionally called vir-
tues, which move an administrator to act upon principle, even in the face of anticipated 
resistance or punishment.” Unlike the discipline approach, the virtue approach lacks 
clear defi nition of what should be standard behaviour. It involves cognitive activity. 
An important issue about the two aspects of administrative ethics discussed 
above is whether countries should pay more attention to either. Debate on the pre-
eminence of both is not very pronounced in literature. However, a number of schol-
ars, for example, Anello, (2006), UNDP (2007) and Demmke and Moilanen, (2011) 
have implicitly accorded relative importance to the virtue approach. Anello (2006) 
agrees that the two approaches cannot be used in isolation. He therefore gives equal 
importance to the two strategies and argues that neither is suffi  cient if used alone, but 
coordinated use of both or a mixed approach is required to have a signifi cant impact 
on establishing ethical practices within an institution. Underscoring the importance 
of the two strategies also, Demmke and Moilanen (2011, p. 7) consider that the virtue 
approach is more comprehensive in covering all areas of human actions, arguing that:
Ethical laws, principles and standards do not cover all areas of human actions, 
nor do they always help in dealing with ethical dilemmas and personal con-
fl icts. Th is also suggests that ethically good or acceptable behaviour can be 
defi ned not only by focusing on obedience to rules but encompasses also such 
issues like justice and fairness, leadership, ethical culture and the broader so-
cial context of behaviour.
Cooper (1987, p. 323) supports this position by positing that virtuous conduct 
does not amount to merely conditioned refl ect behaviour as would law; it is not just 
unthinking habitual response to stimuli; even though the term ‘habit’ is sometimes 
used to characterize virtues, one might say that reason is employed in addressing 
particular situations, but with a certain pre-established attitude and a conditioned 
will (Cooper, 1987, p. 323). Rohr (1989) tends to support this view, since for him, 
administrative discretion is the foundation of administrative ethics. Hence, an of-
fi cial requires a habitual sense of justice and virtue to interpret the mind of law. Nev-
ertheless, Rohr also believes that a government employee should ‘work within the 
system’ (obey the law) even at occasional risk to his soul. He therefore believes that 
the most important ethical infrastructure for the public offi  cial or the bureaucrat on 
whom his work is restrictively focused is the formal, legal or institutional controls. 
But to the extent that these “are either non-existent or ineff ective, bureaucrats have 
the ethical obligation to respond to the values of the people in whose name they 
govern. Th e values in question are not popular whims of the moment, but rather 
constitutional or regime values. Th is is because the bureaucrat has taken an oath 
to uphold the Constitution” (Rohr, 1989, pp. 4–5). Rohr perceives that “all forms of 
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organizational life demand compromises of values one holds dear. Th e person who 
is unwilling to ‘risk his soul occasionally like the rest of us’ cannot contribute con-
structively to any organization” (Rohr, 1989, p. 10).
For some scholars, it is the ethical environment or climate that should deter-
mine which of the approaches should command more importance. Th e compliance-
based approach seems more appropriate to situations in which unethical behaviour 
is rampant and will be diffi  cult to change, while the integrity-based approach appears 
more appropriate to situations in which there is a strong shared sense of values, and 
a higher degree of homogeneity (UNDP, 2007). Ethical climate can be defi ned as 
the perception of what constitutes right behaviour and thus becomes a psychologi-
cal mechanism through which ethical issues are managed (Martin & Cullen 2006, 
p. 177). In a weak ethical environment such as Nigeria, stealing government resourc-
es for instance appears to be heroic. People only aspire to government positions to 
get rich and indeed one will be considered foolish and stupid by his people to remain 
poor aft er holding an exalted public offi  ce. In this kind of environment, it is obvious 
that the political will and even the psychological disposition of offi  cials to do what 
is universally acceptable as ethical may not be achieved through the value approach 
or poor attitude to formal, legal or institutional controls. In such an environment 
where unethical behaviour has reached a crisis, where people tend to retain posi-
tions despite obvious ethical scandals, and where corrupt individuals are celebrated 
and honoured, there is little doubt that fi nding ways to strengthen the disciplinary 
approach to administrative ethics will be the way to go. Working to change such 
a permissive ethical climate will likely be more successful by enacting and enforcing 
codes of ethics, policies, and directives that specify, discourage, monitor, and cor-
rect unethical behavior. In this vein, the disciplinary approach should not be seen 
only in the mere establishment of what constitutes administrative ethics (law, rules 
and regulations, codes), but in the manner of enforcement of sanctions against bad 
conduct. It entails eff ective administrative control, transparency and accountability 
in governance. Laws and ethical codes without committed enforcement ‘lacks teeth’ 
(Geuras & Garofalo, 2011, p. 5) as a measure to fi ght unethical behaviour.
Th e Nature of Ethics Infrastructure
Scholars and institutions concerned with administrative ethics have expand-
ed the two strategies to administrative ethics to showcase specifi c elements usu-
ally referred to as ethics infrastructure, which countries have employed to pursue 
ethics in their public service. Th e Public Management Committee (PUMA) of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2000) has, 
through a 1999 survey, identifi ed important elements that OECD countries gener-
ally use to promote integrity and prevent unethical conduct in the public service. 
Th e elements constitute a framework that has popularly been referred to as ethics 
infrastructure. While the framework was specifi cally used by PUMA to provide 
comparative information about OECD countries, there is a close-fi t of the frame-
work to what other countries use in their concern to maintain well-functioning 
institutions and systems for promoting ethics in their public service. Th ese ele-
ments are encapsulated in the table below.
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Table 1
OECD Ethics Infrastructure
Political 
commitment:
Governmental policies and programmes that do not receive support from the 
highest political and administrative levels will likely fail. In the absence of 
sustained political commitment to ethical behaviour in the administration, eff orts 
to encourage such behaviour will be in vain
Workable codes 
of conduct:
Codes of conduct play a vital role in stating the expected standards of behaviour
Professional 
socialisation 
mechanisms:
Socialisation mechanisms are the processes by which public servants learn and 
adopt ethical norms, standards of conduct, and public service values. Training 
(induction and ongoing) is an essential element to raise ethics awareness and 
develop skills capable of solving ethical dilemmas; good role models (especially 
managers) also serve this purpose. Th e content of the codes of conduct or 
even legal provisions remains simply words on paper, if it is not adequately 
communicated and inculcated
Ethics 
coordinating 
body:
Th ese take various forms – parliamentary committees, central agencies, or 
specially created bodies – and assume various functions: “general promoter” of 
public sector ethics. Th e existence of a coordinating body should not be construed 
as absolving departments and managers of the responsibility for ensuring ethical 
conduct within their jurisdictions
Supportive 
public service 
conditions:
Th e high standards of ethical conduct expected of public offi  cials are one side 
of the coin. Th e other side is a “package” which provides decent working and 
living conditions for the “servants of the public”. Th is “package” consists of 
such basic elements as suffi  cient job security, opportunities for promotion and 
career development, fair remuneration or social appreciation. Fair and impartial 
human resources management policies can ensure that selection and promotion 
processes in the public sector are based on general professional requirements 
and non-discrimination, and that other factors, such as, for example, political 
considerations, are minimised. If public servants are feeling underpaid, over-
worked and insecure, then they are less likely to embrace initiatives to improve 
performance including in the ethical domain
Eff ective legal 
framework:
Th e legal framework is the “teeth” of the overall ethics infrastructure. Laws and 
regulations defi ne the basic standards of behaviour for public servants and enforce 
them through systems of investigation and prosecution. In reviewing its legal 
framework, a country must check that existing criminal codes and civil service 
laws, confl ict of interest statutes and other regulations which apply to public 
servants are clear and consistent 
Effi  cient 
accountability 
mechanisms:
Accountability mechanisms should encourage ethical behaviour by making 
unethical activities hard to commit and easy to detect. Accountability mechanisms 
set guidelines for government activities, for checking that results have been 
achieved, and for checking that due process has been observed. Th ey include 
internal administrative procedures (requirements that activities or requests be 
recorded in writing), comprehensive processes such as audits and evaluations of 
an agency’s performance, or new forms of procedures such as whistle-blowing 
(which can encourage public servants to expose wrongdoing committed by 
others or to say no when asked to do something inappropriate). Th ey might also 
be external to the public service: for example, oversight mechanisms such as 
legislative or parliamentary committees
Active civil 
society:
Ethics is everybody’s responsibility, including that of an assertive media, which 
through its probing reporting helps citizens to act as watchdog over the actions 
of public offi  cials. Freedom of information laws guarantee citizen access to public 
information from the late 1960s and they can institutionalize and support public 
awareness and responsiveness 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2000, pp. 24–25).
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It is not generally agreed how to classify these elements in relation to the 
discipline and virtue approaches. Anello (2006) provides a slightly diff erent eth-
ics infrastructure whose components are:
– A framework of moral values and ethical principles
– A code of conduct
– A programme for the socialization of an ethical framework and code of 
conduct
– Established anti‐corruption legislation
– Established administrative procedures
– Mechanisms for whistle‐blowing (ombudsman)
– Sanctions on reprehensible acts
– Mechanisms for collaboration between existing anti‐corruption agencies
– Management, coordination and evaluation of an ethical infrastructure
These find corresponding elements in the OECD ethics infrastructure 
above. Anello (2006) classifies the first three components of his ethics infra-
structure as based on the values approach and the remaining six on the disci-
plinary approach. 
In our inclination to argue that the disciplinary approach should be more 
eff ective in a permissive ethical environment, coupled with the factor that Nige-
ria attempts to legislate every possible features of the infrastructure as we shall 
see briefl y, we consider seven of the OECD ethics infrastructure as relevant for 
the disciplinary strategy. Only the element of supportive public service condi-
tions is used here as the virtue approach whereby good pay for public offi  cials 
is perceived as helping to reduce moral culpability. Th is element is explained in 
(OECD, 2000, pp. 24–25) thus:
The high standards of ethical conduct expected of public officials are one 
side of the coin. Th e other side is a “package” which provides decent work-
ing and living conditions for the “servants of the public”. This “package” 
consists of such basic elements as suffi  cient job security, opportunities for 
promotion and career development, fair remuneration or social apprecia-
tion. Fair and impartial human resources management policies can ensure 
that selection and promotion processes in the public sector are based on 
general professional requirements and non-discrimination, and that oth-
er factors, such as, for example, political considerations, are minimised. 
If  public servants are feeling underpaid, over-worked and insecure, then 
they are less likely to embrace initiatives to improve performance including 
the ethical domain.
In this study, all the features of this element are operationalized in terms 
of relative pay of the higher and lower offi  cials. For further clarifi cation, higher 
public offi  cials are understood here as political offi  cials that oversee the public 
institutions and the higher career offi  cials of the directorate rank. Th ese are of-
fi cials that head units, sections, departments or an entire Ministry, Department 
or Agency (MDA). Th e rest of the rank and fi le in public organizations are con-
sidered lower offi  cials.
Th e OECD (2000) makes another classifi cation of the ethics infrastructure 
that is also very apt. It employs a three functional classification of Guidance, 
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Management and Control to underscore the expected role of each element of the 
ethics infrastructure in promoting administrative ethics. Th is classifi cation not 
only takes care of the legalistic/sanction and value/incentive roles suggested by 
Anello (2006), but additionally underscores the critical relevance of organiza-
tional roles such as leadership and management in providing the necessary co-
ordination required for ethics in public service. Guidance is provided by strong 
commitment from political leadership; statements of values such as codes of 
conduct; and professional socialisation activities such as education and train-
ing. Management can be realised through co-ordination by a  special body or 
an existing central management agency, and through public service conditions, 
management policies and practices. Control is assured primarily through a le-
gal framework enabling independent investigation and prosecution; eff ective 
accountability and control mechanisms; transparency, public involvement and 
scrutiny (OECD, 2000, p. 23).
Apparently, where leadership and management are morally weak, control 
will obviously be weak as well. Provision of incentives and sanctions in them-
selves are not suffi  cient to engender ethical behaviour without eff orts to guide, 
lead and control public offi  cials. Control is not just the issue of having laws and 
sanctions, codes of behaviour and so on, but the commitment to enforce these 
in the interest of the public trust. It is argued that no amount of sanctions exist-
ing in a public service system can ensure eff ective ethical behaviour where the 
drive does not originate from the leadership. Th is is why a former Chief Justice 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Edward Hennessey, declared that 
ethics must begin at the top of an organisation. It is a leadership issue and the 
chief executive must set an example (Butts and Rich, 2008). Indeed, leadership 
unites the two aspects of administrative ethics since it is the leader that should 
be responsible for the enforcement of sanctions and compliance-based ethical 
systems as well as motivate subordinates to ethical behaviour through values ap-
proach. Butts and Rich (2008, pp. 141–142) aver that: 
Substantively, leaders can use their power in a positive way to infl uence peo-
ple through role modeling… thus using a virtue ethics approach…. Structur-
ally, ethical leadership involves a strategic planning process so that policies, 
decision-making processes, consultation, accountability and ethical stan-
dards, and ongoing assessment and monitoring are in place to ensure ethical 
practice by the leader and followers. Ethical leadership has a structural com-
ponent and a substantive character component. 
In all, administrative ethics are effective through a process of laws and 
sanctions, as well as incentive and support system that improve the moral 
will and rationality of employees to act rightly in the face of an ethical di-
lemma. The challenge to administrative ethics in most countries including 
Nigeria is therefore not in the absence of sanctions or incentives but in the 
commitment and subjection of leadership and management to administra-
tive control, enforcement of sanctions and role modeling. The clear diver-
gence in ethical status of countries is determined by the attention paid to the 
components of existing ethics infrastructure rather than how beautifully the 
codes sound. 
33
Ikeanyibe, O., Ibietan, J. Th e Eff ect of Pay and Administrative Control on Ethical Behaviour in the Nigerian Public Service
Ethical Role of Pay Structure in the 
Nigerian Public Service
There exists wide salary disparity between the political and career of-
ficials in the Nigerian public service in favour of the political officials. The 
remuneration of political officials in Nigeria has always been couched in se-
crecy. Indeed, at some point, political leaders unilaterally fixed their salaries 
themselves. For instance, after the birth of the Second Republic in 1979, the 
first duty performed by the National Assembly was to fix their salary and al-
lowances which was so high that it irked the Nigerian Labour Congress to 
demand a salary increase (Adejokun, n.d.). Though the 1999 constitution has 
assigned the duty of fixing the remuneration of public officials to the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), nothing seems to 
have changed about the arbitrariness and impunity with which this is done. 
RMAFC believes in fixing reasonable packages for political officials in a bid 
to discourage stealing and minimize incidences of corruption in public offices 
(Ibid.). But it is surprising why this principle does not also count regarding 
fixing the salaries of career employees. 
What is baffling is that Nigerian political officials are known to be among 
the highest paid in the world in spite of the fact that the country is one of 
the poorest in the world. In his analysis of the Nigerian Export-Import Bank 
Economic Confidential Report, Adejokun (n.d.) observes that political office 
holders in the executive and legislature, including judicial officers totaling 
1,268 with the federal government earn a combined pay of NGN173.6 billion. 
While 4,418 individuals functioning in the same category in the 36 states earned 
a combined NGN360.091 billion, and 11,788 officers in the 774 local govern-
ments earned NGN592.8 billion. Th e above fi gures add up to NGN1.126 trillion 
as pay for 17,474 political offi  ce holders in country of 175 million people with 
a total budget of about NGN5 trillion. As a matter of fact, the Remuneration 
Act of 2008 pegs the annual salary of a Senator at NGN8.2 million, and a Mem-
ber of the House of Representatives at NGN4.2 million. Th is is generally be-
lieved not to be exclusive. Other allowances have been estimated to be tenfold 
of the salary. Allowances and the perks of offi  ce usually account far more than 
the salary (Daily Trust, 2015). 
In the face of this gross abuse, the minimum wage for an average Nigerian 
civil servant is NGN18,000 for the federal civil servant, and signifi cantly less for 
the states and local government’ employees. Eff orts to improve the remuneration 
of public servants over the years usually face enormous challenges including in-
fl ation and low fi nancial capacity of the government. In a pay reform carried out 
by the administration under President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2004, the Salaries, 
Wages and Emolument Relativity Panel (Prof. E. C. Edozien Panel 2004–2006), 
and the Presidential Committee on the Consolidation of Emoluments in the Pub-
lic Sector (Chief Ernest Shonekan Panel, 2006) recommendations led to the in-
troduction of the monetization policy. Th e policy had sought to establish some 
coherence in the wide disparity in salaries and allowances among various groups 
in the public service. Th rough the reforms, a total of thirteen categories of salary 
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structures were recognised through the various stages of implementation of the 
monetization policy. Th e table below shows the minimum and maximum emol-
uments and their compression ratios for various cadres of consolidated salary 
structures in the federal service. 
Table 2
Consolidated Salary Structure of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service
S/No. Salary Structure
Lowest Pay 
(Per Annum), NGN 
Highest Pay 
(Per Annum), NGN
Compression 
Ratio
1 CONPSS 226,800 5,452,136 1:24
2 CONTISS II 303,850 5,316,520 1:17.5
3 CONUASS II 1,274,177 6,030,963 1:4.73
4 CONRAISS 303,850 5,316,520 1:17.5
5 CONPCASS 1,084,017 5,407,503 1:5
6 CONTEDISS 303,850 5,316,520 1: 17.5
7 CONMESS 1,316,488 5,139,000 1:3.9
8 CONHESS 267,870 5,139,000 1:19.18
9 CONPASS 517,020 6,647,581 1: 12.86
10 CONPOSS 517,020 6,647,581 1:12.86
11 CONAFSS 592,953 8,134745 1:13.72
12 CONICSS 603,917 8,825,764 1:14.61
13 CONTOPSAL 5,265,701 13,880,666 1:2.64
Source: Egbule (2015, p. 11).
From the above table, it can be observed that enormous pay disparity still ex-
ists not only among the lowest and highest paid offi  cials, but also among the vari-
ous consolidated pay categories in the service. Nevertheless, one clear fact is that 
the salary of those who are supposed to oversee and control the administrative 
hierarchy (high administrative offi  cials) are in good standing to discourage what 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) regard as temptation for corruption. Th e Con-
solidated Public Service Salary Structure (CONPSS), that is, the structure for the 
career core civil service, constitutional bodies, National Assembly Staff , Judiciary 
Staff  and some Parastatals, shows that the annual emolument for the lowest em-
ployee is NGN226, 800 and the highest paid civil servant is NGN5, 452,136. Th e 
compression ratio is 1:24, implying that the highest paid civil servant earns twenty 
four times more than the lowest paid offi  cials. In others words, the lowest paid 
staff  earns a mere 4.12 per cent of the salary of the highest paid offi  cial. With this 
scenario, if pay determines ethical behaviour, it is expected that unethical fi nancial 
practices should be higher among the lower paid offi  cials than among political and 
high administrative public offi  cials. 
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Factors that Enhance Unethical Financial Behaviour 
in the Nigerian Public Service
Nigeria is undoubtedly ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world. She is ranked 136 out of the 175 countries in the 2016 Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Th e Nigerian media are daily awash 
with reported cases of corruption among public offi  cials. David Cameron, the pre-
vious British Prime Minister, described Nigeria as fantastically corrupt. Indeed by 
his own estimate, Nigeria and Afghanistan could be the two most corrupt coun-
tries in the world (Vanguard, 2016). Cameron could not have been speaking from 
mere imagination as his position as the British Prime Minister, and the negotiation 
of the two countries about repatriation of stolen funds stashed by Nigerian politi-
cians in British banks should equip him with reasonable information concerning 
the value of money laundered by Nigerian public offi  cials to foreign banks. 
Of course, the reality of high level corruption is irrespective of the various 
eff orts made to prevent it. Th e country would usually be among the fi rst to sub-
scribe to international conventions and treaties about corruption fi ghting and 
ethics in public administration, or locally initiated programmes in this regard. 
Th e Udoji Public Service Reform Committee in 1974 (Ikeanyibe, 2010) recom-
mended the introduction of the code of conduct for public offi  cials. Th is was 
eventually recognised in the 1979 constitution. Since then, the Code of Conduct 
Bureau (CCB) has maintained a permanence in subsequent constitutions in-
cluding the present 1999 constitution (as amended). Th e Code of Conduct for 
Public Offi  cers listed in the Fift h Schedule of the 1999 Constitution as amended, 
Part 1, paragraphs 1 to 14 provides some important ethical codes that could help 
promote ethical behaviour if judiciously enforced. Provisions include:
– Confl ict of Interest: A public offi  cer shall not put himself in a position where 
his personal interest confl icts with his duties and responsibilities.
– Prohibition of Foreign Accounts: Th e President, Vice President, Governor, 
Deputy Governor, Ministers of the Government of the federation and Com-
missioners of the Governments of the States, members of the National As-
sembly and the Houses of Assembly of the States, and such other public of-
fi cers or persons as the National Assembly may by law prescribe shall not 
maintain or operate a bank account in any country outside Nigeria.
– Prohibition against accepting any gift s or benefi ts – (1) a public offi  cer shall 
not ask for or accept property or benefi ts of any kind for himself or any other 
person on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the 
discharge of his duties. (2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this para-
graph, the receipt by a public offi  cer of any gift s or benefi ts from commercial 
fi rms, business enterprises or persons who have contracts with government 
shall be presumed to have been received in contravention of the said sub-
paragraph unless the contrary is proved.
– Restriction on Loans, Gift s or Benefi ts to certain Public Offi  cers – Th e Presi-
dent or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy Governor, Minister of the Gov-
ernment of the Federation or Commissioner of the Government of the State, 
or any other public offi  cer who holds the offi  ce of a Permanent Secretary or 
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head of any public corporation, university, or other parastatal organization 
shall not accept: (a) a loan, except from government or its agencies, a bank, 
building society, mortgage institution or other fi nancial institutions recog-
nized by law, and (b) any benefi t of whatever nature from any company, con-
tractor; or businessman, or the nominee or agent of such person; provided 
that the head of a public corporation or of a university or other parastatal or-
ganization may, subject to the rules and regulations of the body, accept a loan 
from such body.
– Declaration of Assets – Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every 
public offi  cer shall within three months aft er the coming into force of this 
Code of Conduct or immediately aft er taking offi  ce and thereaft er (a) at the 
end of every four years; and (b) at the end of the term of offi  ce; submit to the 
Code of Conduct Bureau a  written declaration of all his properties, assets 
and liabilities and those of his unmarried children under the age of 18 years. 
Any statement in such declaration that is found to be false by any authority or 
person authorized in that behalf to verify it shall be deemed to be a breach of 
this Code. Any property or assets acquired by a public offi  cer aft er any dec-
laration required under this Constitution and which is not fairly attributable 
to income, gift  or loan approved by this Code shall be deemed to have been 
acquired in breach of this Code unless the contrary is proved.
– Agents and Nominees – A public offi  cer who does any act prohibited by this 
Code through a nominee, trustee or other agent shall be deemed ipso facto to 
have committed a breach of this Code.
Th e 1988 public service reforms encapsulated in the Civil Service Reorganiza-
tion Decree No 43 of 1988 had long introduced the audit alarm and other preventive 
ethical principles including whistle-blowing in the public service and new proce-
dures for the processing of funds. Th ere have been frequent administrative reforms 
since colonial times, making one change or another to ensure eff ective, transparent 
and accountable public service (Olaopa, 2008; Ikeanyibe, 2010; Anazodo, Okoye & 
Chukwuemeka, 2012).
More recently, Nigeria was among the fi rst countries in Africa to introduce 
public procurement and fi scal responsibility reforms, from 2003 to 2007, in ac-
cordance with the agreement of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the Group of 8 richest countries of the world, to work to enthrone 
good governance in Africa. Th e country has various institutions (the police includ-
ed) that fi ght corruption. Th e Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Off ences Commission (ICPC) was inaugurated in 2000 to receive complaints, in-
vestigate and prosecute off enders, review and modify the systems and procedures 
of public bodies as well as to educate the public and foster their support in com-
bating corruption. Th e Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was 
established in 2004 through the Economic and Financial Crimes Establishment 
Act (2004). Th e Act empowers the EFCC to prevent, investigate, prosecute and 
penalize economic and fi nancial crimes. 
In the drive towards these accountability and transparency measures and 
anti-corruption reform eff orts, the country in 2003 voluntarily signed the glob-
al Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as part of the National 
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Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) comprehensive 
socio-economic reforms. Th e country began the process of legal enactment to 
back the domiciliation of the initiative, and in 2007, a specifi c law (the Nigeria 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, NEITI) was enacted making Ni-
geria the fi rst country in the global EITI to support implementation with legisla-
tion (NEITI, 2016). Again, the Nigeria National Assembly passed the Freedom 
of Information Act in 2011 to make public records and information more freely 
available, provide for public access to public records and information, protect 
public records and information to the extent consistent with the public interest 
and the protection of personal privacy, and to protect serving public offi  cers 
from adverse consequences of disclosing certain kinds of offi  cial information 
without authorization and establish procedures for the achievement of those 
purposes and for related matters. A key objective of the act is to enhance public 
scrutiny of public sector operations. For instance, Section 2 (3) of the act makes 
provision for what every governmental institution should publish. Th ese include 
materials containing information relating to any grant or contract made by or 
between the institution and another public institution or private organization, 
a description of the organization and responsibilities of the institution including 
details of the programmes and functions of each division, branch and depart-
ment of the institution, and information relating to the receipt or expenditure of 
public or other funds of the institution. 
In spite of the long institutionalisation and legislation of these codes, estab-
lishment of multiple corruption fi ghting agencies and other control measures, 
the rising rate or persistent high level corruption and fraud in the public sector 
shows that these eff orts have had little impact in the prevention, detection and 
prosecution of corrupt public offi  cials. Contract infl ation is a permanent feature 
of the Nigerian public sector. Ownership of foreign bank accounts is common 
among offi  cials. Th e on-going investigation of some of the high profi le offi  cials 
in the former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration reveals the rot in 
high political offi  ces. 
Yet ethical codes are legislated, and the fi ght against corruption is always 
claimed by every successive government. Th e administration of President Obasan-
jo (1999–2007) and that the current president, Buhari have had the disposition to 
probe some of the activities of past governments. Former President Obasanjo’s 
administration had probed the late General Sani Abacha’s regime, while Presi-
dent Buhari is currently investigating some activities of former President Good-
luck Jonathan’s administration. However, to limit the probe of past governments to 
only these two bespeaks of vindictiveness and vengeance, which supports the view 
that the anti-corruption fi ght is merely political and only directed against enemies 
and opponents. Th is is because there were clear issues of highly corrupt practices 
that took place in other administrations such as that of General Ibrahim Badamasi 
Babangida (1985 to 1993), General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998 to 1999) and 
former President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 to 2007) that are not being called to 
question. For instance, Nigerians had, since the Gulf War of 1991, asked questions 
about the oil windfall of USD12.4 billion that was not accounted for during Gen-
eral Babangida’s administration (Oladimeji, 2016a). During the former President 
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Obasanjo’s administration, Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reached 
an all-time high (152 of 159) in 2005 (Transparency International, 2016). It was 
during his administration that the popular exchange of money through ‘Ghana 
must go’ (a common fi bre-made sack) bags to get the wishes of the President in-
cluding the infamous third term bid rubber-stamped by the legislature was rife. 
It was the era of election and campaign fi nancing through the budgets allocated to 
certain Ministries like the Ministry of Works. It is therefore justifi ed when fi ght-
ing corruption is perceived as either sectional or selective of acclaimed political 
enemies rather than any genuine political will to deal with the monster.
High profi le corruption in Nigeria is strongly infl uenced by the nature and 
ineff ectiveness of the country’s political and administrative control measures and 
the criminal justice system. Th ere is indeed a poor connection between the re-
ports of internal and external audits of public organizations with the activities of 
anti-corruption agencies. Th us, the agencies oft en have to rely on petitions and 
whistle-blowing. While this is helpful, there is also the need for offi  cial linkage to 
ensure eff ective monitoring and investigation of infractions through the internal 
and external audit reports of organizations. Again, the criminal justice system in 
the country has been found to be a signifi cant draw-back in the fi ght against cor-
ruption, even by high standing political offi  cials themselves (Lagos State Govern-
ment, 2017; Channels Television, 2017). Delays in the administration of Justice, 
light punishment for off enders, corruption in the judiciary and outdated court 
administration procedures that pay much attention to court processes rather than 
the substance of cases are all issues in this direction. 
As a matter of fact, many high profi le corruption cases being prosecuted by 
the anti-corruption agencies have been stalled by mere legal procedures, injunc-
tions and interlocutory appeals. In 2015, the ICPC chairman, Ekpo Nta, remarked 
that over 400 corruption-related cases were being prosecuted by the agency and 
blamed the judiciary for the draw-backs experienced in the prosecution. For 
EFCC, at least forty three high profi le corruption cases have been stalled between 
2007 and 2015 by judicial processes (Alli, 2016). Cases involving former gover-
nors of the states alone constitute 37 per cent and include: Danjuma Goje (Gombe 
State), Jolly Nyame (Taraba State), Joshua Dariye (Plateau State), Orji Uzor Kalu 
(Abia state), Saminu Turaki (Jigawa), the late Audu Abubakar (Kogi), Timipr-
eye Sylva (Bayelsa), Murtala Nyako (Adamawa), Sule Lamido (Jigawa), Adebayo 
Alao-Akala (Oyo), Rashidi Ladoja (Oyo), Chimaroke Nnamani (Enugu), Gbenga 
Daniel (Ogun), Aliyu Akwe Doma (Nasarawa), Attahiru Bafarawa (Sokoto), and 
Abdullahi Adamu (Nasarawa). Other high-profi le cases involving political and 
administrative heads of government agencies or their non-offi  cial accomplices 
constitute about 21 per cent and include those of ex-Minister Babalola Borishade, 
a former Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, Steve Oronsaye, Sani Teidi 
Shuaibu and other pension scam suspects, Esai Dangabar and seven others over 
police pension fraud, Mamman Tukur and others on NGN1.2 billion oil subsidy 
scandal, Walter Wagbatsoma in connection with oil subsidy, Abdullahi Alao and 
others (NGN2.6 billion oil subsidy scam), NASAMAN Oil Services Limited for 
NGN4billion oil subsidy case, Chidi Adabanya (NGN2 billion obtained from Shell 
Petroleum Development Company) and others (Alli, 2016).
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In the face of the legal frustrations arising from the poor judicial administra-
tive system such as unrestricted preliminary objections, trial within trial; inter-
locutory appeals that oft en reach the Supreme Court before re-commencing at 
the lower court depending on the outcome, re-assigning of trial judges, abuse of 
court process, illness of defendants, absconding of accused persons, fi ling of fresh 
charges, and jumping of court bail among others, the anti-graft  agencies oft en 
resort to plea bargaining deals to settled corruption cases. A plea bargain is “a ne-
gotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant [who] pleads 
guilty to lesser off ence or to one or more multiple charges in exchange for some 
concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the 
other charges” (Garner, 2004, p. 1189). Oft en the anti-corruption agencies do not 
have suffi  cient funds to prosecute these cases while the accused usually deploy 
their enormous stolen fi nancial resources to truncate the course of justice. 
Th e ICPC boss revealed that over 90 per cent of the agency’s budget is used 
for prosecution instead of the ideal situation where at least 60 percent should be 
used on prevention strategies (Daniel & Umoru, 2015). In the face of such con-
straints, the anti-graft  agencies have had to strike a plea bargain with corrupt in-
dividuals to return part of their loot for their release. Some typical cases settled 
in this manner include: a one-time Chief of Air Staff  arraigned with 10 others by 
EFCC on 26 count charges bordering on conspiracy, stealing, fraud and money 
laundering of a total of NGN22.8 billion (Anaba, 2016); former Acting Director 
General of Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Haruna Jauro for 
an alleged fraud of NGN304.1million (Ships and Ports, 2016); a former governor 
of Edo State, Lucky Igbinedion for various fraud and unethical fi nancial crimes 
amounting to 191 count charges (Ikhide, 2008); a  former Inspector General of 
Police, Tafa Balogun accused of NGN17 billion in 2005; and a former governor 
of Enugu State, Chief Chimaroke Nnamani accused of NGN5billion fraud and 
embezzlement of the state’s fund (Oladimeji, 2016b). Invariably, once an accused 
public offi  cial feels he could return part of his loot to be free from punishment, 
he negotiated that option, otherwise spanners were eff ortlessly thrown into the 
works of the prosecution to delay or evade justice. Criminal cases bordering on 
huge fi nancial crimes by public offi  cials that should receive maximum punish-
ment to discourage potential off enders have been reduced to civil cases that could 
be settled out of court through plea bargain, while allowing looters to seek and 
occupy other political positions shamelessly.
While we allow the legal experts to debate the usefulness of the plea bargain, 
it is not diffi  cult to see that the system does not support a strict sanction or dis-
ciplinary approach to administrative ethics and will not likely prevent unethical 
behaviour since potential looters are given a benign option in corruption cases. 
Similarly, the judicial system that makes it diffi  cult to convict off enders or mete 
out light punishment for weighty off ences does not support an eff ective control 
and preventive approach. Th e failure of the Nigerian criminal justice system to ef-
fectively and severely punish the erring rich and mighty is infamous (Oladimeji, 
2016b), and therefore does not show much political commitment to deal with un-
ethical practices among the high public offi  cials. A major incentive to corruption in 
Nigeria is the sacred cow treatment given to the high profi le looters of public funds. 
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Even in the present administration (of President Buhari) that claims that the 
fi ght against corruption is a priority, most Nigerians are not impressed with the 
way allegations against some members of the cabinet are being handled. For in-
stance, the Nigerian Senate called for the removal and prosecution of the Secre-
tary to the Federal Government (SGF), Babachir Lawal, who was alleged to have 
breached the country’s contract award law. His company, Global Vision Ltd., was 
one of the companies indicted for allegedly benefi ting from infl ated and phan-
tom contracts – or ones not executed at all. Th e contracts were awarded by the 
Presidential Initiative on the North East (Adebayo & Tukur, 2016). Similarly, the 
appointment of the present Chairman of EFCC was not confi rmed by the Senate 
based on an unfavourable report regarding sound ethical status by the Department 
of State Services (DSS), (Umoru & Erunke, 2016). President Buhari had written 
back to the Senate alleging an unfair hearing and procedural error in the Senate 
report. While it is not fair that an individual should be punished for an off ence he 
or she has not committed, it is more supportive of transparency and public trust 
in a government that suspected or accused individuals should resign or be relieved 
of their public offi  ce until they prove themselves otherwise. Th is is more crucial 
in a system where corruption has become a way of life and the public trust in the 
commitment of political leaders to deal with it is wavering. 
Despite the fact that the country has emphasized the legislative approach by 
legislating every relevant ethical code, she has not shown a strong sanction ap-
proach in dealing with her ethical challenge. Th us, the multiple laws against un-
ethical fi nancial practices fail to serve the purpose securing compliance. Th is is 
because political and administrative controls are loose and the reality is that the 
country treats unethical behaviour with kid gloves, especially among the high po-
litical offi  cials. Eff ective political and administrative control should support cor-
ruption prevention eff orts by monitoring the management of public resources, 
detecting and signaling individual defi ciencies and systemic weaknesses (OECD, 
2000). As it is, the anti-graft  war in Nigeria is rather reactive and cosmetic than 
preventive and sanction driven.
Concluding Remarks
Being consistently ranked by Transparency International among the most 
corrupt nations in the world, it is clear that the Nigerian ethical climate is very 
conducive to corruption. It therefore requires more of the compliance-based ethi-
cal system. Th e compliance-based approach is more appropriate to situations in 
which unethical behaviour is rampant and will be diffi  cult to change, while the 
integrity-based approach appears more appropriate to situations in which there is 
a strong shared sense of values, and a higher degree of homogeneity (UNDP, 2007). 
Apparently, Nigeria gives the impression of using the disciplinary or sanctions ap-
proach. While eff orts are made to establish laws criminalizing direct and indirect 
actions that lead to corruption, and sign international conventions to fi ght corrupt 
practices, the study shows that the criminal justice system treats corruption with 
kid gloves and provides support for high public offi  cials to be senselessly corrupt 
rather than work to prevent it. Special attention has not been paid to offi  cials in 
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positions that are particularly susceptible to corruption. Creating a disciplinary 
ethical climate cannot be complete without strong enforcement and consequential 
outcomes that are suffi  cient to discourage potential off enders. 
Th us, as far as the punishment for corrupt conducts is light and ample loop-
holes exist for suspects to manipulate the judicial system, citizens will continue 
to be attracted to government positions to get rich and indeed, as is usually the 
case, one will be considered foolish and stupid by his people to remain poor aft er 
holding an exalted public offi  ce. In this kind of ethical environment, it is obvi-
ous that the political will and even the psychological disposition of offi  cials to do 
what is universally acceptable or to rely more on the value approach to do what is 
right may not produce signifi cant results. Th is is the reason why better pay for the 
higher political and career offi  cials has not been signifi cant in reducing unethical 
conduct among them. Th e divergence in the level of corruption observed among 
the high profi le public offi  cials and the low ones lies in the eff ectiveness of politi-
cal and administrative control measures. Th e low level employees are subjected to 
a series of administrative controls exercised by the hierarchy of their institutions; 
but the high level political and administrative offi  cials have little control resulting 
from lack of transparency and openness in government, weak civil society actions 
and ineff ective political leadership and will. 
Subjecting politicians and high level career administrators to greater societal 
pressures through more open and transparent measures including the use of open 
bidding approaches for government contracts, exploiting and strengthening the 
whistle-blowing policy recently introduced by the Federal Ministry of Finance, 
could help to strengthen the control system. Th ere is also need to consider enact-
ing a  law that could establish a  separate system of courts to handle corruption 
cases, recognize lifelines in handling and dispensing the cases and signifi cantly 
reviewing the punishments, including death sentences for corrupt acts involving 
some benchmark monetary value. It is perhaps thanks to the severity of punish-
ment and a very strict attitude towards corruption and the Chinese criminal jus-
tice system that that country and many others in Asia as well have been doing 
a very good job in preventing and punishing corruption (Yunhai, 2005).
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